INTRODUCTION
Long-term care accounts for a sizable part of the Medicaid budget, almost $54 billion in 1995. Three-fourths of Medicaid expenditures for the elderly were for LTC (about $31 billion); 85 percent of these expenditures were for institutional care, and 10 percent were for home care ser vices (Wiener and Stevenson, 1997) .
The locus of LTC has been shifting from institutions to care based in the home and community. One reason is that beneficia ries often desire to remain in their homes and would prefer to receive LTC in non institutional settings. Another reason is the potential cost-effectiveness of home and community-based care, although there are still conflicting results on this issue Noemi V. Rudolph and James Lubitz are with the Office of Strategic Planning, Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of HCFA. (Alecxih, Lutzky, and Corea, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994; Wiener and Stevenson, 1998) . Nonetheless, vari ous programs, especially those targeted to individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, are testing integrated health delivery systems and payment methodolo gies that reflect the shift toward home and community-based care.
Because Medicaid is the primary payer for LTC, there has been a movement to control costs in Medicaid through demon strations that expand home and communi ty-based services (HCBS) or integrate acute ser vices and long-term ser vices through managed care and through the use of capitation payments. HCFA has authority under certain statutes to waive certain provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to implement demon stration projects. These waivers permit HCFA to pay for services that would other wise not be reimbursable and to use differ ent methods of paying for services and costs. The MSHO is an example of a pro gram operating under Medicare and Medicaid demonstration waivers. This program attempts to address the issue of fragmented care for beneficiaries entitled to both Medicaid and Medicare by inte grating acute care and LTC through a cap itated system.
Other States are also exploring the inte gration of acute care and LTC through Medicare and Medicaid capitation. Our analysis examines the capitated payment approaches for LTC services of five pro grams: PACE, ALTCS, Texas STAR+PLUS, MSHO, and the Monroe County CCNs in New York. Under the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, PACE became a regular part of the Medicare program with a limit ed number of site expansions available annually; the others are being implement ed as demonstration programs, with the exception of Texas STAR+PLUS, which is operating under a program waiver.
These five programs were chosen to rep resent a range of capitated LTC programs financed through Medicaid, not because they are the only approaches. In addition, the programs either entirely target or have a strong component for dually eligible indi viduals. There has been much interest, but little has been written about the mecha nisms for capitation of LTC ser vices through Medicaid for these programs. In this article, we provide an insight into each program's LTC benefit package, method of capitation, and amount of capitation. In addition, the analysis highlights common alities and differences in the methodolo gies and their implications. The study methodology consisted of a review of doc uments from each program, including pro gram proposals, protocol documents, stan dard contracts, actuarial and evaluation reports, and informal interviews with pro gram staff and HCFA project officers for the respective programs.
Each of the five programs has addressed the following key features in developing a Medicaid capitation: (1) defining the eligi ble population, (2) determining which ser vices will be included in the capitated pay ment and which will be paid for on a fee-for service (FFS) basis, (3) for the portion that is capitated, deciding whether there will be multiple rate cells for population subgroups or a single rate for all eligible persons, (4) determining which data will be used to cal culate the rate, and (5) determining whether any discounts will be applied. 
Monroe County CCNs
Monroe County (New York) CCN will be a voluntary demonstration program targeted to enroll at least 10,000 elderly Medicare and dually eligible persons in the county, includ ing those who meet a nursing home level of care placement but who live in the commu nity. The program will integrate primary, acute, and LTC services under combined Medicare and Medicaid capitation pay ments. These payments will be risk adjust ed, using a methodology based on function al status. Waivers for the CCN demonstra tion were approved in September 1999. 
DEFINING THE ELIGIBLE POPULATION

BENEFITS COVERED IN THE CAPITATION
LTC benefit coverage for the different programs integrates institutional and com munity-based services with an emphasis on the latter. A summary of benefits cov ered by the programs included in the Medicaid capitation is provided in Table 1 .
In addition to the LTC services, the pro grams also include Medicaid acute and ancillary services in the capitation with some variation. PACE, ALTCS, and CCN include transportation services. ALTCS also includes behavioral health. In Texas STAR+PLUS, the capitation amount for Medicaid-only participants includes acute care and LTC services. However, the Medicaid capitation amount for dually eli gible persons includes LTC services only. For dually eligible beneficiaries, Medicare covers most acute care costs, and Medicaid FFS covers acute care services such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, coinsur ance, and deductibles. In MSHO, the rate structure differentiates between an institu tional and non-institutional rate for Medicaid acute and ancillary services.
Nursing facility benefits covered in the capitation also vary among the programs. Room and board are included in the capita tion for all of the programs except for MSHO. Nursing facility per diems are paid directly by the State for those who enroll in MSHO while in a nursing facility or after 180 days if a community-dwelling enrollee enters a nursing facility.
There are financial incentives built into the previously mentioned programs to keep enrollees out of institutional settings. All programs place plans at risk for some or all nursing home care. Among the pro grams, PACE provides the strongest incen tive by placing the sites at risk for all insti tutional care regardless of duration. Texas STAR+PLUS places liability for nursing home services for the first 120 days on the plans. In MSHO, plans are at risk for the first 180 days of nursing home care for enrollees living in the community and thereafter are reimbursed at the FFS cost. The expected nursing facility use for the first 180 days of a nursing facility stay is built into the rate as the nursing facility add-on.
Under the CCN plan, for those who are not impaired on enrollment but who become impaired, it is proposed that plans be at risk for nursing home services for the remainder of the year. For example, if a person becomes impaired in the third month following enrollment in the pro gram, the plan would be at risk for any and all services for the rest of the year (i.e., 9 months). If a person becomes impaired in the eleventh month following enrollment, the plan is at risk for institutional care (or any other care) for 1 month.
Similar to PACE, ALTCS places contrac tors at risk for all LTC services. The total capitation rate is set using a negotiated 
1 Defined in the Social Security Act as services that may be provided as home and community-based waiver services.
2 Listed as both a Medicaid service and home and community-based waiver service.
3 Services that may be provided under the home and community-based waiver program but subject to Health Care Financing Administration approval. expected mix of HCBS and institutionaling the large number of Medicare-only ized enrollees. Because institutionalized beneficiaries who are targeted for the proenrollees are more expensive to care for, gram. Medicare-only beneficiaries who contractors have the incentive to keep have been determined to be NHC upon enrollees out of institutions. The mix enrollment can buy coverage similar to the assumption is negotiated and differs by Medicaid LTC and home and communitycounty. ALTCS contractors are placed at based type benefits. These Medicare-only risk for nursing facility care on an enrolledbeneficiaries choosing this benefit pay the population level. This differs from MSHO, Medicaid capitation amount for NHC Texas STAR+PLUS, and CCN, which place enrollees. plans at risk on an individual-enrollee level, CCN will also offer an extended home limiting plan liability to a certain number of and community care benefit package days.
designed for all Medicare-only enrollees The Monroe County CCN demonstraand available after a 6-month waiting peri tion will have an additional benefit package od. This benefit is intended to prevent ben different from the other programs, reflecteficiaries from becoming institutionalized. The value of services that a beneficiary can SETTING THE CAPITATION RATE receive will be capped at $2,600 per benefi ciary per year, with a $6,000 lifetime limit.
There are a number of factors to considThese limits were determined through an er in ratesetting for these programs. They actuarial analysis of expected use, cominclude: (1) deciding whether there will be bined with an assessment of a competitive multiple rate cells for population subhealth maintenance organization premium groups or a single rate for all eligible perin the market area. The services to be sons, (2) determining the data that will be offered include adult day care, respite care, used as the basis for the rate, and (3) deter home-delivered meals, and transportation, mining whether any discounts will be plus other services such as social work applied. In this section, we discuss the spe interventions. Payment for this benefit cific rate-setting methodologies used by package will be in the form of a premium each program; in the next section, we procharged to all Medicare-only enrollees.
vide an examination of these three key factors. A summary of Medicaid capitation amounts paid to program contractors is provided in Table 2 .
PACE
The PACE Medicaid capitation rate is based on Medicaid FFS expenditures for individuals who meet the program's eligi bility criteria, 55 years of age and over (65 in some States), and who are NHC. Acute and LTC costs for these individuals are included in the rate. Medicaid rate methodologies used in the sites are sum marized in Table 3 . As the table shows, in some States, the PACE capitation was based on costs for the nursing facility popu lations. In others, it was an average that blended the per capita costs of the nursing facility population with other groups in dif ferent care settings, such as those receiving HCBS. Many States used discount factors to ensure savings to the State.
ALTCS
The ALTCS capitation payment is an example of a single rate derived from a blend of several components: institutional costs, HCBS costs, the mix of HCBS and institutional costs, and other costs (acute care, behavioral health care, case manage ment, administration, and profit). The rate is a weighted average of the per capita costs of the institutional and HCBS popula tions, with extra weighting of the HCBS group to provide an incentive to reduce institutionalization. As previously stated, ALTCS is comprised of two population groups: the elderly and physically disabled and the mentally retarded/developmental ly disabled. However, only the rates for the elderly and physically disabled are dis cussed. A single contractor serves all the elderly and physically disabled enrollees in a county.
Before fiscal year 1994, the institutional component rate was based on nursing home rates, the HCBS component rate was based on historical costs, and the HCBS/institutional mix assumption was based on historical experience and the cap placed on the amount of HCBS use. Adjustments were made retrospectively based on actual experience because of the absence of experience under ALTCS. Retroactive adjustments were made after the end of the contract year and included adjustments for actual Medicare and thirdparty liability recoveries, patient share of cost, therapies, and the HCBS/institutional service mix.
In 1994 and 1995, rates paid to ALTCS contractors were developed based on bids on each of 11 capitation rate components: monthly institutional costs, monthly HCBS costs, HCBS/institutional mix, Medicare or third-party liability, patient share of cost, capitation lag, case-management costs, administration costs, mental health ser vices costs, acute care services costs, and profit (for private contractors). The bids were compared with ranges developed by the State. Bids above the top of the rate ranges for each component were reduced to the midpoint of the range as an incentive not to overbid. Component rates were then added to get the monthly capitation payment. Retroactive adjustments were made for actual experience with mental health service costs, Medicare payments, patient share of cost, and the HCBS/insti tutional mix. The mix-assumption adjust ment was subject to a risk corridor, where the State and the contractor shared the financial risk if there were more institu tional beneficiaries than had been assumed in the rate calculation.
In fiscal years 1996 and 1997, ALTCS made several changes to the rate-setting methodology. Contractors submitted bids for five capitation rate components (month- Colorado Net costs to the State of nursing facility and home and community-based services populations (weighted based on current distribution of LTC enrollees, which is 82 percent nursing facility/18 percent home and community-based services).
The rate is discounted 5 percent.
1,486
Hawaii State expenditures for the nursing facility population.
2,100
Illinois Based on blended average of costs of nursing facility and home and community-based services populations (weighted 75 percent nursing facility/25 percent home and community-based services)
1,588
Massachusetts Blended average of nursing facility and home and community-based services.
2,044
Maryland Blended average of the total costs to the State for 3 population groups: nursing facilitiy (30 percent), adult day care (60 percent), and other home and community-based services (10 percent). State has developed 4 separate rates based on eligibility for Medicare and Supplemental Security Income. Michigan FFS costs of a nursing facility population institutionalized for the full year. State is currently reviewing methodology.
1,841
New Mexico 95 percent of net nursing facility costs plus prescription drug costs for nursing facility population. The net nursing facility costs are reduced by 5 percent.
2,046
New York Initial rates are based on FFS costs of nursing facility and comparable LTC populations. Subsequent rates take into consideration 1,2 3,965 two major components: plan's projected operations and FFS equivalent. 
2,298
Ohio FFS costs of nursing facility and home and community-based services recipients weighted based on their distribution in the service area. The rate is discounted by 5 percent.
2,296
Oregon Assisted living facility rate plus average acute care costs of assisted living facility population plus $13 enrollment fee. The assisted living facility rate is discounted by 5 percent.
1,706
Pennsylvania Statewide average costs (net expenditures) for a nursing facility population. The rate is discounted by 5 percent.
2,473
South Carolina State's net expenditures for a nursing facility population in a comparable geographic area. The rate is discounted by 5 percent.
2,021
Texas Average nursing facility rates weighted by El Paso County nursing facility case mix distribution, less the average statewide applied income plus actual average additional expenditures for nursing facility population. The rate is discounted by 5 percent.
1,819
Virginia Costs for all LTC populations. An adjustment was made to reduce the weighting for those who were 100 percent skilled nursing facility. State plans to use 6 rates based on aid code and Medicare eligibility. The rate is discounted by 5 percent.
1,824
Washington Total costs of care for nursing facility residents in King County--those in a nursing facility for 3 or moremonths in the year. The rate is discounted by 5 percent. FFS is fee-for-service. SOURCE: Adapted from (Iversen and Shen, 1996) .
ly institutional costs, monthly HCBS costs, monthly acute care costs including mental health services, administration, and profit/risk/contingency). Bids above the rate ranges for each of these components were reduced to below the midpoint of the range. ALTCS set the amount for case management, patient share of cost, and the HCBS/institutional mix. Two items are reconciled to actual experience after the end of the contract year: HCBS/institution al mix and patient share of cost.
Texas STAR+PLUS
The Texas STAR+PLUS, MSHO, and Monroe County CCNs use a methodology involving multiple rate cells. In Texas, the rate cells are based on two eligibility class es: Medicaid-only and dually eligible. Within each class, there are four groups, based on place of service:
• HCBS waiver clients.
• Other community clients.
• Nursing facility clients (medical assis tance).
•Nursing facility clients (Supplemental Security Income) (Table 3) . Enrollees assigned to the category of nursing facility clients (medical assistance) have incomes above the Supplemental Security Income limit but below 300 per cent of that limit.
In Texas STAR+PLUS, the capitation amount for Medicaid-only participants is based on FFS costs for both acute care and LTC services. The Medicaid capitation amount for dually eligible persons includes LTC services only. For dually eligible ben eficiaries, Medicare covers most of their acute care costs, and Medicaid FFS covers the Medicaid acute care services, such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, and Medicare coinsurance and deductibles. In the rate calculation, nursing home costs were dis counted by 2 percent from FFS costs, and community care, HCBS, and acute care costs were discounted by 5 percent. The State will monitor enrollment and deter mine whether a disproportionate number of heavy users of LTC or acute care enroll in one plan or another. Similar to ALTCS, the State proposes to make adjustments either during the first year or at the end of the year to account for these differences.
MSHO
Minnesota developed four rate cate gories: (1) for residents in institutions, (2) for those institutionalized for 180 days who then move to the community, (3) for NHC persons living in the community, and (4) for community-dwelling non-NHC persons. The MSHO capitation for institutionalized residents is comprised of the institutional Prepaid Medical Assistance Program (PMAP) rate. The PMAP rate covers Medicaid acute and ancillary services and is based on historical experience in the FFS environment, trended forward, and specific to the following demographic fac tors: age, sex, geographic region, institu tional status, and Medicare eligibility. The nursing facility costs (i.e., room, board, and nursing care) remain FFS.
MSHO's Medicaid capitation for the cate gory of persons who are institutionalized but then return to the community includes the amount of 95 percent of twice the average monthly elderly waiver payment, plus the institutional PMAP rate. The elderly waiver program provides HCBS in place of nursing facility services for the elderly who want to remain in the community. The average monthly elderly waiver payment is calculat ed using an NHC population, adjusted for age, sex, and geographic region, and reflects a 5-percent discount from the FFS average monthly payment equivalent. Persons who convert from institutionalized to communitydwelling are limited to 1 year in that rate cell.
The community NHC rate includes the non-institutional PMAP rate, plus 95 per cent of the average monthly elderly waiver payment, and a nursing facility add-on. The nursing facility add-on estimates the expected cost of the first 180 days of nurs ing facility use by a community population. This allows MSHO to hold health plans liable for the first 180 days of nursing facil ity use. After 180 days, nursing facility costs are reimbursed at the FFS level. For the community non-NHC category, the rate includes the non-institutional PMAP rate plus the nursing facility add-on.
CCNs
Similar to MSHO, the Monroe County CCN rate will be structured around four population groups: (1) those who are nurs ing home residents, (2) those who were institutionalized for more than 5 months and then moved into community settings, (3) those who are impaired and NHC, living in the community, and (4) those who are unimpaired and living in the community. The ratesetting methodology will use riskadjusted rates for both Medicare and Medicaid, based on age, sex, Medicaid cate gory eligibility, and functional status based on a Division of Medical Services-1 (DMS 1) score. (The DMS-1 is an assessment tool used by the State of New York to determine nursing home certifiability. Questions on the DMS-1 cover activities of daily living, skilled care needs, and behavioral status. The DMS-1-based model of nursing home certifiability predicts 18 percent of the vari ance in Medicaid chronic care service costs of the NHC dually eligible population.)
The Medicaid payment for nursing home residents who enroll in the program is calculated based on a facility-specific per diem rate derived from an annual case-mix review, adjusted to include appropriate ancillary costs and discounted at 98 per cent of current cost. Those who are not eli gible for Medicaid will pay the facility's discounted private charge. Medicaid capi tation or private payment for those who were institutionalized and then moved into the community is the same as those for nursing home residents.
Medicaid capitation for the impaired (NHC) in the community will be based on three levels of functional status as deter mined by their DMS-1 score.
The Medicaid rate structure for communitybased unimpaired persons is derived from historic FFS expenditures and uses rate cells based on Medicaid category and age.
DISCUSSION
There are important differences and commonalities in the approaches taken by the various programs in setting capitation rates. The programs differ in how pay ment varies by enrollee characteristics and on the data used to determine the basis for the rate. Financial incentives to reduce institutionalization and discounts from FFS costs are common in all the programs, but the methodology varies across sites.
Single Rate Versus Multiple Rate Cells
The PACE and ALTCS capitation pay ments are examples of a single rate for all eli gible persons, i.e., NHC populations. Most States pay a single rate to PACE providers, but California, Wisconsin, and New York are exceptions. In California, PACE rates vary according to age, sex, and region; in New York and Wisconsin, PACE rates differ according to whether the patient is at the skilled or intermediate care level. In ALTCS, rates do not vary prospectively according to patient characteristics, but as noted, there can be adjustments if the HCBS/institutional mix varies from projections. 
Extent to Which Plans Face Risk
All the programs have financial incen tives to reduce institutionalization. In Texas STAR+PLUS, MSHO, and CCN, plans are responsible for the first 4 to 6 months of nursing facility care; PACE plans are completely at risk. The ALTCS approach also places plans at risk, though there are retrospective adjustments to reflect the actual HCBS/institutional mix. In addition, MSHO and CCN provide a financial incentive for deinstitutionalization. In CCN, plans will be at risk for care for enrollees entering a nursing facility until the anniversary of the person's enrollment.
Discounts
Most of the programs incorporate a dis count from the historical, current, or pro jected FFS costs to ensure savings to Medicaid. The Medicaid rate in various PACE sites is discounted between 5 and 15 percent. In Texas STAR+PLUS, the nurs ing facility costs are discounted by 2 per cent from projected FFS costs. Community care, home and communitybased care, and acute care costs per mem ber per month are discounted by 5 percent from projected FFS costs. The MSHO rate structure reflects a 5-percent discount in some of its rate components. In the CCN program, rate cells for nursing home resi dents and those who were institutionalized and then returned to the community are each discounted by 2 percent of current costs. The rates for the community-based unimpaired and impaired populations are discounted by 5 percent of the FFS costs.
Although there are some commonalities among the programs, it is evident that the overall approach chosen by each program is different. The differences largely stem from a State's LTC environment in which the program is being developed, a State's infrastructure, political considerations, and market conditions. For example, multiple States are involved with the PACE pro gram. All of them share a similar approach in that the capitation is based on current FFS expenditures for a comparable popula tion and for a comprehensive Medicaid package of services. However, there is no standard method for PACE Medicaid capi tation. Development of PACE programs and the ratesetting reflects State policy decisions as to where PACE should be positioned within the existing LTC system or State desires to encourage expansion of community-based alternatives (Iversen and Shen, 1996) . For States where PACE is viewed as an alternative to nursing facil ity care, the current spending for the nurs ing facility population is used for rateset ting. In other States where PACE is viewed as one option among many, includ ing nursing facility care or HCBS pro grams, the States use a blend of current nursing facility and HCBS program enrollee spending to calculate the rate. The differences in risk assumption may depend upon the incentives a particular program or State wants to develop, the political interactions between State agen cies and provider organizations, and the market forces that factor into provider decisions on how much risk to assume.
These different approaches raise ques tions as to the likely consequences (of each approach) in terms of provider behavior and the potential for cost-shifting or adverse selection. Assuming that HCBS care is more cost-effective than institution alized care, it might be expected that the more a plan is at risk for nursing facility care, the more care would be provided in the community, and the greater would be the incentive to develop approaches to reduce institutionalization. For example, PACE providers (who are at full risk for nursing home cost) have more of an incen-tive to maintain the enrollee at maximum functional level than do MSHO providers, who are reimbursed under FFS after 180 days.
Evaluation results of the ALTCS program found that home care was being used as a substitute for nursing home care and was cost-effective (McCall et al., 1997) . Preliminary results of the PACE evaluation revealed an increased use of the adult day centers and ambulatory services and a reduction in utilization of hospital and nurs ing home services (Burstein, White, and Kidder, 1996) . Beneficiary survey data were used rather than Medicare and/or Medicaid utilization data. Further study to compare the survey results with secondary claims data would be desirable to confirm these findings. The effect of the degree of financial risk for nursing home care on the share of LTC provided in the community versus the nursing facility should be explored for other programs that place providers at risk for nursing facility care.
The potential for cost shifting to Medicare is greater in programs such as ALTCS and Texas STAR+PLUS, which cap itate only Medicaid. Having both the Medicare and Medicaid benefits provided through capitation is one way to ensure that there is no cost shifting from one payer to another. Another way to ensure no cost shifting back to FFS is to lock in the payment until the beneficiary dies or chooses to disenroll.
A single contractor serves all ALTCS enrollees in a county. This differentiates the ALTCS program from the other pro grams in that having all eligible partici pants enrolling in a single plan provides some protection from the consequences associated with adverse risk selection (Muskie School of Public Ser vice, University of Southern Maine, and the National Academy for State Health Policy, 1997). The mandatory nature of Medicaid in the ALTCS and Texas STAR+PLUS pro grams also reduces the potential effects of adverse risk selection. Concern has been raised about the CCN program design ele ment that allows impaired Medicare-only enrollees to elect to have their chronic care services covered by privately paying the equivalent of the Medicaid capitation rate to cover all such services. This might expose the plans to considerable financial risk if a large number of impaired enrollees choose this option and their cost of care exceeds the capitated payment rate.
Movement toward community-based care could, in theory, be promoted by cap itation because capitation should remove the financial incentive to institutionalize. There is evidence among evaluations of acute care programs that managed care may reduce the use of costly institutional services such as hospitalizations or emer gency rooms (Riley, Coburn, and Kilbreth, 1990; Hurley, Freund, and Paul, 1993; McCall, Korb, and Driver, 1995) . These results may apply to LTC programs. Capitation seems to provide an incentive to delay or avoid institutionalization. The the ory is that a managed care plan would choose the best setting for LTC, although there would now be an incentive to avoid the most expensive setting. The planned evaluations of Texas STAR+PLUS, MSHO, and CCN should provide data on the extent to which capitation has, in fact, promoted community care.
The described programs provide evi dence for the increasing interest in capita tion for LTC services. Interest also stems from cost-containment pressures and the perceived cost-effectiveness of communitybased programs and from the desire to provide financial incentives to maintain patients in the community.
It will be important to evaluate the suc cess of these approaches in terms of cost savings, incentives for appropriate place-ment and care delivery, and impact on Medicaid and Medicare costs. Because plans are placed at risk for the care of one of the most vulnerable segments of the Medicaid population, it is crucial that pay ment systems achieve a balance between incentives for cost savings and appropriate care delivery.
